The sequence of events is not complicated. It is merely bad.

On Friday afternoon, Keir Starmer authorized the United States to use British bases, including Diego Garcia, for offensive strikes against Iranian missile sites threatening the Strait of Hormuz. [1] Previously, UK bases had been available only for what the Ministry of Defence called "limited and defensive" operations. Starmer's decision widened that permission without putting the question to Parliament.

Iran's response arrived with the efficiency of a diplomatic cable. Tehran fired two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia, the UK-US military installation on the Chagos Islands, some 3,800 kilometers from Iranian soil. [1] Neither missile hit. One was shot down by a U.S. warship. The other failed in flight. [1]

The MoD called the strikes "reckless." It is not clear that adjective does sufficient work. Britain went from permissive basing to being a direct target inside a single news cycle.

The political consequences arrived even faster. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch described Starmer's authorization as the "mother of all U-turns" and told Times Radio the UK was "being dragged into" the conflict. [1] The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party both demanded that further base permissions be subject to a parliamentary vote. [1]

The constitutional question is now unavoidable. The Prime Minister authorized the use of British sovereign territory for offensive strikes in a war that Parliament has not debated, let alone approved. When a British territory was struck in return, Starmer's justification narrowed rather than expanded: the MoD insisted the operations remained "specific and limited defensive operations." That language is doing rather a lot of heavy lifting for a decision that put Diego Garcia on Iran's target list.

Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, framed the attack as self-defence, posting on X that Starmer was "putting British lives in danger by allowing UK bases to be used for aggression against Iran." [1] Trump, characteristically, said the UK "should have acted a lot faster." [1] When both your adversary and your ally are criticizing the same decision for opposite reasons, the decision may be less about strategy than about being caught between pressures.

Starmer has announced a Cobra meeting next week to discuss the economic impact on British households. That is useful but secondary. The primary question is not about energy prices. It is about who decides when Britain goes to war.

The broader diplomatic frame is no less awkward. Twenty-two countries, including the UK, issued a joint statement condemning Iran's attacks on commercial vessels and energy facilities. [1] Starmer also spoke to the Crown Prince of Bahrain about deploying a team of experts to help counter drone attacks. [1] These are the actions of a government that wants to be seen managing a crisis, not joining a war.

But the distinction between managing and joining collapsed when the authorization was issued. The UK is now inside the conflict's operational perimeter. The Chagos Islands already sat at the intersection of sovereignty disputes and military utility, after Starmer's government agreed to cede sovereignty to Mauritius while leasing back the base. That deal now has a new complication: the base it was designed to preserve has been targeted because of a decision the prime minister made without parliamentary consent.

Diego Garcia is 2,360 miles from Iran. It is approximately zero miles from the question of whether the executive can commit British territory to a war that Parliament has not authorized.

A Cobra meeting about gas prices will not answer that question.

-- CHARLES ASHFORD, London