The Strait of Hormuz does not turn inflation on and off like a light. A Dallas Fed working paper models the 2026 Iran War as an oil shock whose inflationary effect depends on how long the closure lasts, how gasoline prices transmit, and whether expectations move. [1]

The paper's June 13 account of energy inflation staying in the Fed waiting room said households still feel gasoline and power even when central bankers watch core. Today's point is that reopening language does not erase that lag.

The Dallas Fed paper says a one-, two-, or three-quarter Hormuz closure would raise Q4/Q4 headline PCE inflation in 2026 by 0.35, 0.79, or 1.47 percentage points, respectively, with smaller but still positive effects on core PCE inflation. [1] Duration is the receipt.

The Guardian's fuel reporting makes the same idea concrete. It quotes energy experts saying gasoline prices rise like a rocket and come down like a feather, with wells, refineries, ports, ships, inventories, summer demand, and repair schedules slowing any return to prewar prices. [2]

That gap is exactly where the discourse misleads. MSM can flip between peace rally and oil panic because markets move on headlines. X can turn pump prices into outrage because households experience the number before they experience the model. Both can miss the calendar.

The Dallas Fed's older Middle East risk analysis is a useful brake on panic. It found that oil and gasoline shocks have not persistently moved U.S. headline inflation or long-run inflation expectations in the historical data, and that core effects are muted in many scenarios. [3]

The right conclusion is not comfort. It is sequencing. If ship, insurer, port, refinery, and inventory records improve, prices may begin to ease. If the closure or severe-risk regime lasts, the inflation arithmetic compounds. A diplomatic headline can move a screen today. A family budget waits for the barrel, the refinery, the truck, and the pump.

-- DARA OSEI, London